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NIPPING CRIME IN THE BUD? THE USE OF ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
INTERVENTIONS WITH YOUNG PEOPLE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
SAM LEWIS, ADAM CRAWFORD AND PETER TRAYNOR 
 
This article presents findings from a study of the use of anti-social behaviour (ASB) warning 
letters, Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs) and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) 
with 3,481 young people from four large metropolitan areas in England which challenge 
dominant narratives about their use and impact. The findings unsettle prevailing beliefs 
concerning the targeted use of ASB interventions to tackle low-level incivilities and the timing 
RIWKHLUXVHZLWKLQD\RXQJSHUVRQ¶VGHYLDQWWUDMHFWRU\7hey also contest the logical sequencing 
of behaviour regulation strategies by demonstrating the haphazard deployment of ASB 
sanctions within complex webs of prevention, ASB and youth justice interventions. The article 
concludes by considering the findings alongside recent youth justice trends in England and 
Wales.           
 
Key Words: Anti-social behaviour, youth, regulation, prevention, diversion  
 
Introduction 
The late 1980s and 1990s saw a rise in media reports of incivilities and crime in areas of social 
housing amidst concern that police efforts to address such problems were being stymied by a 
lack of resources, witnesses and evidence (Card 2006: 52). A consultation paper published by 
the Labour Party, whilst in opposition, entitled A Quiet Life: Tough Action on Criminal 
Neighbours, proposed new measures to address µFULPLQDOanti-social behaviour¶, stating that 
minor disputes should be resolved through mediation and conciliation (Labour Party 1995). 
The following year the Conservative Government embedded the notion of ASB in legislation 
and inaugurated the tide of regulatory reform witnessed over the subsequent two decades. 
Section 152 of the Housing Act 1996 enabled courts to grant injunctions against ASB to prevent 
individuals µHQJDJLQJ in or threatening to engage in conduct causing or likely to cause a 
QXLVDQFHRUDQQR\DQFH¶ in areas of social housing. Although ASB was not defined, Section 152 
VWDWHGWKDWDQLQMXQFWLRQFRXOGRQO\EHJUDQWHGZKHQWKHµUHVSRQGHQWKDVXVHGRUWKUHDWHQHGWR
use YLROHQFH¶. The apparent focus of both main political parties at that time was upon the 
repeated, pernicious criminal acts of some social housing tenants which existing criminal 
procedures were deemed ill-equipped to address (Field 2003).  
In the years since, ASB has become a major political, media and public preoccupation. 
Over time, however, political and public conceptions of the nature of ASB have changed. The 
legal framing of ASB in Section 1(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (heUHDIWHUµWKH
$FW¶ DV DFWLYLW\ µWKDW FDXVHGRUZDV OLNHO\ WR FDXVHKDUDVVPHQW DODUPRUGLVWUHVV¶ WR
SHUVRQVRXWVLGHRIWKHSHUSHWUDWRU¶VKRXVHKROG lacks precision by design. Attempts to narrow 
the definition as the legislation passed through Parliament were resisted by the new Labour 
Government (Macdonald 2006: 187-8) and the broad definition was defended on the grounds 
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that µDQWLVRFLDOEHKDYLRXULVLQKHUHQWO\DORFDOSUREOHPDQGIDOOVWREHGHILQHGDWDORFDOOHYHO¶
(House of Commons 2005: 20). In a small number of high profile cases grievous crime has 
been termed ASBWKHUHE\µWULYLDOLVLQJWKHVHULRXVO\FULPLQDO¶0LOOLH72). More often, 
however, ASB has been the phrase applied to minor infractions commonly associated with 
young people. The most frequently cited anti-social behaviours witnessed by respondents to 
the Crime Survey for England and Wales 2014/15 were µGULQN UHODWHG EHKDYLRXU¶, µJURXSV
KDQJLQJ DURXQG RQ WKH VWUHHWV¶ DQG µLQFRQVLGHUDWH EHKDYLRXU¶ VXFK DV µ\RXWKV NLFNLQJ 
throZLQJEDOOVLQLQDSSURSULDWHDUHDV¶DQGµF\FOLQJVNDWHERDUGLQJLQSHGHVWULDQDUHDV¶ (ONS 
2015: 118-119). During the Parliamentary passage of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Bill 2013-14 the Coalition Government proposed redefining ASB DVµFRQGXFWFDSDEOH
RI FDXVLQJ QXLVDQFH RU DQQR\DQFH¶. Amidst concern that the new definition could lead to 
children being punished for ordinary childhood behaviours (House of Lords / House of 
Commons 2013) the House of Lords voted to retain the original definition (Hansard 8 January 
2014, col 1543). Nonetheless, these developments illuminate DµJHQHUDOFOLPDWHRILQWROHUDQFH¶
towards children in general and adolescents in particular (UNCRC 2008: 6) and a determination 
to address the risks that they pose to an orderly society.   
The last two decades have seen the rise of a pre-emptive, precautionary approach to crime 
(Zedner 2007). As successive governments have become preoccupied with minimising the 
risks posed by young people, ASB interventions have been recast as preventative tools to µnip 
crime in the bud¶. Although responses to ASB have received considerable academic attention 
(e.g. Brown 2004; Burney 2005; Crawford 2009; Crawford 2013; Millie 2009), conceptual 
debate has often proceeded ahead of an empirical base, or emerged from small-scale studies 
focused on single ASB interventions (e.g. Campbell 2002; Bullock and Jones 2004; Donoghue 
2010). Central to this paper, then, is the presentation of findings from a large-scale study of 
ASB interventions to expand knowledge and inform debate. Whilst recognising the importance 
of the existing literature on ASB, this paper is underpinned by a somewhat different conceptual 
framework, namely that of regulatory theory. Following Parker et al. (2004: 2) it employs a 
brRDGGHILQLWLRQRIµUHJXODWLRQ¶that encompasses the formal and informal strategies used by 
different actors and their intended and unintended consequences. Usefully, regulation 
scholarship has highlighted the distinctive and interconnected dimensions of effectiveness, 
responsiveness and coherence within regulatory regimes (p.10-11). Whilst some ASB scholars 
have considered the effectiveness of individual tools, this study also explored the other 
dimensions in the regulatory triptych. A companion paper, which presents different data 
gathered during the study, explores the extent to which ASB tools are responsive to the 
behaviour of recipients, their capacity for self-regulation and the context within which 
regulation occurs (Crawford et al. 2016). This paper attends to issues of coherence, looking in 
particular at the complex interplay between ASB sanctions and other strategies of behaviour 
regulation.      
The article begins by outlining contemporary perceptions of the use and impact of ASB 
interventions on juveniles as evidenced in central government policy documents, Parliamentary 
debates and academic commentaries. It proceeds to discuss the aims, methods and findings of 
a large-scale study of the use of ASB interventions with young people in England that was 
funded by the Nuffield Foundation. The findings counter assumptions regarding the 
deployment of ASB interventions in response to minor incivilities, challenge beliefs about the 
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timing of their use within a \RXQJSHUVRQ¶Vdeviant trajectory, and refute the logical sequencing 
of prevention, ASB and youth justice interventions. The paper concludes by considering the 
findings alongside recent youth justice trends, highlighting the (sometimes perverse) 
interaction effects between different facets of the regulatory landscape.  
 
Contemporary Perceptions 
Central government ASB policies have been presented as a remedy for the µHYHU\GD\QXLVDQFH
GLVRUGHUDQGFULPH¶+RPH2IILFH5) that is often associated with young people. It is 
suggested that early intervention strategies can stop escalation from low-level incivilities to 
more serious anti-social and criminal behaviour. Such deterministic arguments tend to neglect 
the role of agency and the impact of social structures on behaviour, and research that µshows 
substantial flows out of as well as in to the pool of children who develop chronic conduct 
SUREOHPV¶8WWLQJHPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDONonetheless, this view prevails, as does the 
belief that ASB interventions can interrupt a deviant trajectory (Home Office 2014).   
 Also central to contemporary perceptions is the view that interventions form a hierarchy 
of sanctions or pyramidal structure which, some have suggested (Crawford 2009; Hoffman and 
Macdonald 2011), echo %UDLWKZDLWH¶V enforcement pyramid (Braithwaite 1985). In 
%UDLWKZDLWH¶VRULJLQDOPRGHOPRVWUHJXODWRU\DFWLYLW\occurs at the base of the pyramid and 
FRPSULVHVµJHQWOHVDQFWLRQV¶to encourage self-regulation (Braithwaite 1985: 142). Persistent 
miscreants progress up the pyramid through increasingly command-based sanctions. At the 
apex of the pyramid, crucially, sits the most punitive sanction acting as a deterrent. The latest 
measures to address ASB, like those which they replace, are depicted as forming a pyramid of 
interventions. They DUHVDLGWRµSURYLGHDFOHDUHUSDWKRIFRQVHTXHQFHVDQGVDQFWLRQVIRUWKRVH
ZKR FRQVLVWHQWO\ IDLO WR FKDQJH WKHLU EHKDYLRXU¶ +RPH 2IILFH   WKXV HPERG\LQJ
notions of progression and upward travel.  
 The ASBO was introduced by Section 1 of the 1998 Act and sat at the peak of the 
enforcement pyramid. Their use rose annually until 2005 and then declined until 2012, 
followed by a small rise in 2013 (Home Office / Ministry of Justice 2014a). The order had a 
high breach rate: 58% of ASBOs issued between 1 June 2000 and 31 December 2013 were 
contravened (Home Office / Ministry of Justice 2014a). Subsequently, in 2010, the new 
Coalition Government announced plans to replace the ASBO with the Criminal Behaviour 
Order (CBO) and the Crime Prevention Injunction (CPI) that appeared in the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 KHUHDIWHU µWKH$FW¶and came into force in 
October 2014 and March 2015 respectively.1 
 $Q$%&LVDQLQIRUPDORUµYROXQWDU\¶agreement that sat beneath the ASBO and now sits 
under the CBO and CPI in any hierarchy of interventions (Home Office 2003; Home Office 
2011). This agreement between the perpetrator of ASB and local practitioners is intended to 
encourage self-regulation and desistance. Although central government no longer collates data 
on the use of ABCs, historical records show that their use consistently outstripped that of 
ASBOs. According to the last available annual figures 11,881 ABCs were signed in 2007/08 
                                            
1
 For a detailed discussion of WKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGSKDVHVRIµUHJXODWRU\K\SHUDFWLYLW\¶KHUDOGHGE\WKH$6%
agenda see Crawford (2013) and Crawford et al. (2016) and for an overview of the new measures see Millie 
(2013).   
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(Home Office 2009) whilst just 2,027 ASBOs were made in 2008 and 1,349 in 2013 (Home 
Office / Ministry of Justice 2014b: Table 1). Evidence as to the effectiveness of ABCs remains 
inconclusive. Whilst some quantitative studies have detected less incivility by signatories after 
signing an ABC than in the period immediately before (NAO 2006; Bullock and Jones 2004) 
and fewer individuals subsequently coming to official notice for ASB (Bullock and Jones 
2004), it is not possible to say whether the intervention actually caused any cessation of anti-
social activities. High breach rates have been detected, ranging from 27% for those aged 18 
and over to 61% for those under 18 (NAO 2006). Further, the authors of a small-scale, 
TXDOLWDWLYH VWXG\ QRWHG D µODFXQD¶ EHWZHHQ WKH DSSDUHQWO\ SRVLWLYH HIIHFWV RI $%&V ZKHQ
measured quantitatively and their lived reality (Squires and Stephen 2005). Many of the 
children and families studied doubted the evidence against them, were concerned about 
accompanying threats of eviction, and reported receiving insufficient support from (in 
particular) education and social services to address structural problems. Despite these mixed 
messages official discourse remains positive. IWKDVUHFHQWO\EHHQFODLPHGWKDW$%&VµDUHRIWHQ
used to deal with low-level anti-social behaviour, with one intervention frequently enough to 
VWRSWKHEHKDYLRXUUHFXUULQJ¶+RPH2IILFHDQGWKDWWKH\FDQEHµYHU\HIIHFWLYHDW
dealing with yoXQJSHRSOHHDUO\WRQLSSUREOHPEHKDYLRXUVLQWKHEXGEHIRUHWKH\HVFDODWH¶
(Home Office 2014: 18). 
 According to the dominant narrative, then, ASB is low-level crime and incivility of a 
kind that is closely associated with young people. Most regulatory activity occurs at the base 
RIDµS\UDPLG¶RIVDQFWLRQVWKHVHLQWHUYHQWLRQVDUHHPSOR\HGHDUO\LQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRID
deviant trajectory and use persuasion to promote self-regulation and compliance. Travelling up 
the pyramid, as those persisting in their behaviour progress through different measures, 
sanctions become ever more enforcement-oriented. Whilst there was a general loss of faith in 
the effectiveness of the ASBO, which has now been replaced, the ABC is still regarded as an 
effective response to juvenile incivilities. The paper will now outline the aims of and methods 
employed in a study which explored these assumptions.       
  
Research Aims and Methods 
Recent years have seen growing recognition of a dearth in knowledge around the nature and 
prevalence of ASB (Prior 2009) and the use and effectiveness of different interventions (Rubin 
et al. 2006). In 2008, when this study began, little was known about: the extent, nature and 
impact of different ASB interventions on young people; \RXQJSHRSOH¶V trajectories through 
different ASB interventions; and their journeys through prevention, ASB and youth justice 
strategies and sanctions. This study was designed to address this knowledge gap.         
The research was conducted in four purposively selected Community Safety Partnership 
(CSP) areas. Two are London Boroughs (Sites A and B) and two are large cities in the north of 
England (Sites C and D). All areas were known to have significant levels of crime and ASB; 
large and diverse populations; high levels of social deprivation, and a sizeable social housing 
stock. The sites were also nationally recognised as having developed expertise in monitoring 
and addressing ASBWKUHHZHUHDPRQJVWWKHµ7UDLOEOD]HUV¶DQGµ$FWLRQ$UHDV¶WKDWUHFHLYHG
additional central government funding to address incivility (NAO 2006: 41).  
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Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analysed. As to the former, the 
research team collected details of all individuals under 18 years of age who received an ASB 
warning letter, an ABC or an ASBO KHUHDIWHUµWKHNH\VDQFWLRQV¶during a two-year period 
between 1st April 2008 and 31st March 2010 KHUHDIWHUµWKHstudy SHULRG¶and tracked their 
pathways through these different interventions over time through local DJHQFLHV¶ databases. In 
two of the sites details were also gathered of the prevention and youth justice interventions 
received by this group from databases held by local youth offending services. All data were 
analysed using SPSS. This paper focuses on the findings from this aspect of the study. A 
detailed account of the qualitative research findings, informed by interviews with senior 
managers, practitioners, young people and parents, appears in the companion paper (Crawford 
et al. 2016).  
 
Research Findings 
The findings are presented in two sections. The first section describes the number and 
demographic characteristics of young people included in the study, the types of ASB 
interventions delivered and variations in their use by age, sex and place. The second, more 
discursive section, presents and examines those findings which challenge dominant policy and 
public assumptions. It explores: the types of behaviour that trigger interventions; variations in 
the use of sanctions and strategies; the multi-layered nature of regulation; the timing of 
interventions in any developmental trajectory and life course; and the implications of these 
findings for current practice.  
 
Background information about the study subjects and sanctions 
 
TABLE 1 Number of young people who received interventions by site and gender4 
 
Between 1st April 2008 and 31st March 2010, 3,481 young people from the four sites received 
one or more of the key sanctions. Table 1 shows the number from each site alongside gender 
data and mid-2009 10-17 year old population estimates. In the three sites where gender data 
                                            
2
 YJB 2011, Annex E. 
3
 These figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number. 
4
 Reliable gender data were available in Sites A, B and C in all but a few cases. This explains why Male (N) and 
)HPDOH17RWDO19DOLGSHUFHQWDJHILJXUHVDUHFLWHGKHUHand throughout unless otherwise stated. Robust 
gender data were unavailable in Site D.    
Research 
Site 
Male 
(N) 
Male as 
% of 
total 
Female 
(N) 
Female 
as % of 
total 
Total 
young 
people 
(N) 
Mid-2009 
10-17 
population 
estimates2 
No. per 
10,000 of 
10-17 
population3 
Site A 332 83.8 64 16.2   409 15,000 273 
Site B   83 84.7 15 15.3     99 12,958  76 
Site C 431 81.8 96 18.2   556 68,262  81 
Site D - - -   - 2417 47,757 506 
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were available the majority of recipients were male, as found in previous studies (e.g. NAO 
2006). The number of recipients in relation to the 10-17 year old population size varied widely, 
being over six times greater in the site with the second largest juvenile population (Site D) than 
in that with the largest such population (Site C). Site D, where the number of young people 
known to have received an intervention per 10,000 of the population was highest, was ranked 
in the Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2010 as the second least deprived of the sites (DCLG 
2011).5 These findings suggest that the use of ASB interventions is not linked directly to 
population size or levels of socio-economic deprivation, but is mediated by the willingness and 
ability of individuals and organisations to use these tools.    
 
TABLE 2 Number of young people who received interventions by site and type 
 
The 3,481 study subjects were tracked through agency databases and details gathered of 
interventions received during and prior to the study period. Table 2 shows the number who 
received interventions by site and intervention type. Warning letters, the sanction of first resort, 
are usually sent by the police, often in conjunction with the local council or a social housing 
provider, to an individual (or their parent or guardian in the cases of juveniles) when they first 
come to official notice for ASB. As such, they form the lowest rung in any ladder of sanctions. 
The research team noted significant variation between sites in their form and function, which 
tended to reflect the professional priorities of those concerned. In Site A, young people engaged 
in ASB were referred to the Youth Inclusion and Support Panels (YISPs)7 coordinator who had 
oversight of the five YISPs operating across the borough. The YISPs coordinator then sent a 
µUHIHUUDO WR<,63¶ OHWWHU WR the parents or carers which, as the first stage in the hierarchy of 
sanctions, constituted a warning for the purposes of this study. The appropriate YISP then 
conducted an assessment of risk and need and, where necessary, facilitated support services 
such as µRQH-to-one work, group work, leisure activities, sport, parent support, specific and 
general advice, [and] counselling¶8 Data on the use of warning letters were not available in 
                                            
5
 As indicated by the Indices of Deprivation rank of average rank measure of deprivation.  
6
 The figures include both civil and criminal ASBOs.  
7
 YISPs are multi-agency groups that provide prevention services to young people at risk of becoming 
delinquent (Walker et al. 2007) 
8
 This text comes from the template µUHIHUUDOWR<,63OHWWHU¶LQ Site A.  
Research 
Site 
Number 
with 
letter 
(N) 
Proportion 
with letter 
(%) 
Number 
with 
ABC 
(N) 
Proportion 
with ABC 
(%) 
Number 
with 
ASBO6 
(N) 
Proportion 
with 
ASBO 
(%) 
Total 
young 
people 
(N) 
Site A   405 99.0   57 13.9   11 2.7   409 
Site B   - -   97 98.0     4 4.0     99 
Site C   351 63.1 177 31.8   48 8.6   556 
Site D 2302 95.2 304 12.6   17 0.7 2417 
7 
 
Site B. In Sites C and D, the police-issued warning letters placed less emphasis on the provision 
of support and focused on the need for greater parental control. They also stated that 
enforcement procedures might ensue should problems persist, such as the pursuit of an ABC, 
the imposition of an ASBO or the loss of a social housing tenancy. 
The mean age of recipients of warning letters was between 14.77 and 14.83 years in the 
three sites where warning data were available: the small difference in mean ages between sites 
was not statistically significant.9 Nor was there any statistically significant difference in mean 
ages by sex in the two sites where this information was available (Sites A and C).10 Slightly 
over one quarter (28.0%) were under 14 years old at receipt, almost half (47.0%) were 14 or 
15 and the remainder (25.1%) were 16 or 17. It is worth noting that 25 young people (0.8%) 
were younger than ten, the youngest having come to official notice in Site D IRU µNLFNLQJ
IRRWEDOOVDWSURSHUWLHV¶11 at the age of five. The early use of such interventions and the nature 
of the behaviour that prompted their use will be considered later in the article. There were also 
clear variations between sites in the proportion of individuals who received warning letters and 
other interventions. The reasons for these patterns and their impact upon the hierarchical 
sequencing of interventions will also be examined later.  
All four sites used ABCs to regulate behaviour. The contracts, which in all sites displayed 
the local police and council logos, listed the prohibited behaviours. E[DPSOHVLQFOXGHµ,ZLOO
QRWFDXVHGDPDJHWRDQ\SURSHUW\QRWEHORQJLQJWRPHDQGZLOOQRWHQFRXUDJHRWKHUVWRGRVR¶
6LWH&DQGµ,ZLOOQRWZULWHJUDIILWLDQ\ZKHUH¶6LWH%6RPHFRQWUDFWVDOVRLQFOXGHGSRVLWLYH
requirements sucKDVµ,ZLOOPHHWZLWKP\$%&VXSSRUWZRUNHUUHJXODUO\¶ (Site B) DQGµ,ZLOO
DWWHQGVFKRROGDLO\DQGRQWLPH¶ (Site A). The consequences of breaching the prohibitions were 
cited: these typically included an application for an ASBO and measures in relation to a social 
housing tenancy (e.g. pursuit of a Possession Order or a Demotion Order). The contracts were 
signed by the young person and, if under 16 years of age, an appropriate adult (e.g. their parent 
or guardian) as well as agency representatives.        
The mean age of young people upon receipt of their first ABC was between 14.2 and 
14.7 years across the four sites. The difference between the two sites with the highest (Site D) 
and lowest (Site C) mean ages was statistically significant.12 The difference reflects, in part at 
least, key differences in the hierarchy of interventions operating in each site, as will be 
explained later in the article. Contrary to expectation, mean age at first ABC was lower than 
mean age at first warning in the three sites where these data were available (A, C and D). To 
explore this further, those individuals who received a first warning at least 12 months before 
the end of the study period were separated into two groups, according to whether they also 
signed an ABC at any point up to the end of the study. In Sites A and D, those who received 
both sanctions were significantly younger upon receipt of their first warning than those who 
                                            
9
 Age was calculable for 3,051 of the 3,057 recipients. The comparison of means was conducted using a one-
way ANOVA.  
10
 Assessed using independent samples T-tests.  
11
 This is the behaviour that precipitated the warning as recorded in the police database.  
12
 Age data were available for 600 of the 635 young people with ABCs. A one-way ANOVA across the four 
sites found p = 0.039: further exploration (post hoc Tukey test) found that only the difference between means in 
Sites C and D was statistically significant (p = 0.046). 
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did not progress to an ABC.13 This finding is reminiscent of claims by developmental 
criminologists that early onset of deviance leads to a longer and more persistent deviant career 
(Farrington 1994: 526). It may be, however, that those who come to official notice at a young 
age are more closely monitored during their adolescence and thus more likely to receive 
subsequent interventions (McAra and McVie 2005; 2007; 2010). In Site C, the situation is 
complicated by and may, in part, be due to the unusual hierarchy in operation: most of those 
who signed an ABC were not thought to have had a warning letter beforehand. The article will 
return to this point in due course.   
Although much debate has focused on the ASBO it was the least used of the key 
sanctions, as reflected in national statistics and this study. Just 2% of the study subjects received 
an ASBO (2.3%, n = 80). The mean age upon receipt of a first ASBO ranged from 15.3 to 16.7 
years: the difference in mean ages between sites was not statistically significant. Mean age at 
first ASBO was higher than mean age at ABC in all four sites.     
 
The types of behaviour that trigger interventions 
As already noted, contemporary conceptions of ASB focus on low-level crime and incivility. 
7KH *RYHUQPHQW¶V DWWHPSW WR UHGHILQH $6% HQFRXQWHUHG UHVLVWDQFH WR EULQJLQJ RUGLQDU\
childhood activities within any definition of problematic conduct. Thus ASB by young people, 
in the political and public imagination at least, occupies the hinterland between youthful 
exuberance and serious crime.  
 Sites A and D described the events that precipitated a referral to the YISPs coordinator 
or a police warning letter respectively. There were notable variations between these sites in the 
behaviours that prompted action. In Site A, where 99.0% (n=405) of the 409 cases involved in 
the study were referred to the YISP and the reason was recorded in most cases (95.1%, n=385), 
over two thirds involved an offence (69.9%, n=269) as defined by the Youth Justice Board 
(YJB) for England and Wales (YJB 2014). The most commonly occurring offence type was 
violence against the person, recorded in 19.5% of cases. Theft and handling (12.2%), drugs-
related offences (11.2%) and criminal damage (10.6%) were also common. In those referrals 
that did not involve criminality, the behaviour was often more reminiscent of contemporary 
FRQFHSWLRQVRI$6%VXFKDVµ$6%RQHVWDWHGLVWXUEDQFHWRUHVLGHQWV¶,'VDQGDQG
µ7KURZLQJLWHPVDURXQGLQDQHZVDJHQWV¶,' 
 The referral agency was recorded in 276 (68.1%) of the cases referred to the YISP. In 
most of these cases (62.0%) police made the referral. The YISPs coordinator identified the 
police as one of the main referral agencies and stated that although the police were expected to 
GHDOZLWKLQFLYLOLWLHVWKDWFRQVWLWXWHGFULPLQDORIIHQFHVµWKH\VWDUWHGSXVKLQJLWDOORQWRXV¶14 
Possible explanations include there being insufficient evidence to support a criminal 
prosecution and a desire by the police to reduce their workload. Either way, the use of ASB 
interventions for alleged criminal conduct occurs in the absence of proof, thus bypassing 
fundamental due process protections afforded defendants in criminal proceedings (Ashworth 
HWDO7KHXVHRIPHDVXUHVWRµQLSFULPHLQWKHEXG¶ZLWKLQGLYLGXDOVDOUHDG\HQJDJHG
                                            
13
 Independent samples T-tests found the difference in mean age at first warning for those with / without an 
ABC to be statistically significant in Sites A (p < 0.001) and D (p = 0.001).   
14
 As stated to the research team on 14th November 2011.  
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in serious or persistent offending also contradicts their underpinning logic and challenges 
contemporary perceptions of when they occur in any developmental trajectory of deviant 
behaviour: the haphazard coexistence of different regulatory systems will be examined shortly.     
 In Site D, 2,302 young people received one or more police warning letters. The police 
in Site D operated a two-step system comprising warning letter one (WL1) and warning letter 
two (WL2). WL1 was designed for use with young people when first apprehended for low-
level ASB. It asked parents to cooperate with the police by providing advice and guidance to 
their children, thus attempting to employ informal levers of compliance to engender voluntary 
self-regulation. WL2 was intended for those whose behaviour remained anti-social after a WL1 
or whose first encounter with the police resulted from ASB deemed sufficiently serious to merit 
a WL2. WL2 represented a shift from strategies rooted in voluntary cooperation to enforced 
compliance: it detailed the possible consequences of continued incivility including ABCs, 
parenting contracts and action against social housing tenants. In this site, where 94.1% 
(n=2,275) of the 2,418 cases involved in the study received a WL1 and the reason was recorded 
in most of them (99.7%, n=2,268), alleged offending was a factor in a smaller proportion of 
cases (43.7%, n=992). The PRVWFRPPRQLQIUDFWLRQVZHUHµRWKHUPLQRURIIHQFHV¶ZKLFKZHUH
noted in 29.9% of cases where a reason for the WL1 was recorded (n=677): most of these 
concerned underage drinking. The second most common infraction was violence against the 
person which, in contrast to Site A, was cited in just 6.7% of cases (n=151). Drugs offences 
which typically involved cannabis use (2.6%, n=60), arson (2.6%, n=58) and public order 
offences (2.4%, n=55) were also noted.  
 In most cases, then, WL1s were sent in response to non-criminal infractions (56.3%, 
n=1,276). The throwing of items such as stones, eggs, mud and apples at properties and vehicles 
ZDVDFRPPRQFRPSODLQW2WKHUDFWVLQFOXGHGµVPHDULQJH[FUHPHQWRQSDYHPHQW¶,'
µNLFNLQJIRRWEDOOVDWZLQGRZV¶,'DQGµVKRXWLQJVZHDULQJUXQQLQJLQURDG¶,'
which might reasonably cause harassment, alarm or distress and be deemed anti-social. 
+RZHYHUOHWWHUVZHUHDOVRVHQWWR\RXQJSHRSOHIRUµFOLPELQJRQZDOOV¶,'µVNDWHERDUGLQJ
LQSXEOLFDUHDV¶,'µPRYLQJSDUNEHQFKHV¶,'EHLQJµSDUWRIDQRLV\URZG\ODUJH
JURXS¶ ,'  µUXQQLQJ WKURXJK UHVLGHQWV¶ JDUGHQV¶ ,'  WKURZLQJ µVQRZEDOOV DW
PHPEHUVRI WKHSXEOLF¶ ,'DQGRWKHUKLJK-jinks. It seems that despite efforts by the 
House of Lords and others to exclude ordinary acts of childhood from any official definition 
of ASB, its capacious nature means that such actions are already being sanctioned in some 
places.   
 
The enforcement pyramid and variations in its operation 
Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in contemporary depictions of ASB sanctions is that they 
form a pyramidal system of regulation. There is a presumption that those subject to regulation 
will enter at the base of the pyramid where sanctions are underpinned by strategies of 
persuasion and self-regulation. When these methods fail escalation up the pyramid occurs 
through measures designed to elicit and ultimately enforce compliance through ever-more 
command-based regulation. The ASBO and its replacements, which sit at the apex, are redolent 
of Ayres and %UDLWKZDLWH¶VµEHQLJQELJJXQ¶ (1992: 19-53), rarely used but threatening in the 
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Figure 1 presents an enforcement pyramid comprising the sanctions studied and 
corresponding regulatory strategies as typically conceived. This composite depiction of 
practice across the sites obscures myriad variations in practice, however. There were, for 
example, differences in the number of tiers in the pyramidal structure: Site C sent those at risk 
of an ASBO an µ$6%2warning letter¶ which formed an extra tier between tiers two and three. 
Some of the sites operated variants of the same sanction within individual tiers: Site A operated 
a two-step system of yellow and red ABCs, echoing the penalty card system used in football, 
whilst Site D operated the two-step warning system described above. It was also apparent that, 
across the sites, the same sanctions were sometimes used multiple times before escalation or, 
in the case of the ASBO, after a previous order had expired. 
 
                      
 
FIG. 1 Enforcement pyramid depicting the key ASB sanctions and strategies. 
 
In Site C, the flow of young people into and through the different tiers of sanctions defied 
expectation. In this site, warning letters were issued by the police whilst ABCs were 
DGPLQLVWHUHGE\WKHORFDOFRXQFLO¶VASB unit. Referrals to the unit came from a range of sources 
including the general public. This division of labour created a fissure in the flow of sanctions. 
As a result there was little overlap between those sent a warning letter and those with an ABC: 
only one fifth (n=37, 20.9%) of the 177 ABC recipients were recorded in police databases as 
having received a letter. For the majority of ABC recipients, then, this sanction marked their 
entry point into the pyramid, which may explain why mean age at first ABC was lower here 
than in any other site.    
This and other evidence suggests that the strategies witnessed do not readily conform to 
responsive regulation as traditionally conceived. According to Braithwaite (2011: 493) 
responsive regulators place dialogic, collaborative and restorative sanctions at the base of the 
pyramid and µOLVWHQDFWLYHO\¶LQDPDQQHUWKDWµJLYHVYRLFHWR stakeholders¶. Punishment is not 
foregrounded as this may communicate mistrust by the regulator and promote defiance by the 
regulated (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 47-49). In contrast, the police warning letters that 
Command-based 
regulation 
Persuasion and 
self-regulation 
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typically occupy the base of any ASB sanction pyramid are issued without discussion and often 
emphasise the possible consequences of non-compliance. Whilst ABCs might involve more 
dialogue, power imbalances between the juvenile and practitioner signatories could preclude 
genuine collaboration (Wonnacott 1999: 281-282). Furthermore, as shown above and discussed 
in detail elsewhere, these tools also threaten sanctions for non-compliance, often in heavy-
handed ways that undermine negotiation, trust and voluntariness (Crawford et al. 2016).   
These reflections do not amount to an argument for more system contact, however. The 
Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and Crime (hereafter µWKH(GLQEXUJK6WXG\¶found that 
prevention and early intervention strategies may actually hinder desistance, particularly if they 
cause young people to be labelled as troublesome and occur alongside (and potentially 
precipitate) other interactions with state agencies (McAra and McVie 2005; 2007; 2010). This 
point is particularly pertinent because the regulation of ASB does not occur in a vacuum. 
However, because studies of ASB interventions have tended to focus on their use in isolation, 
their existence within a complex web of regulation comprising multiple systems, strategies and 
interventions has hitherto been obscured.  
 
The multi-layered nature of regulation 
Under a VWUDWHJ\ RI µSURJUHVVLYH XQLYHUVDOLVP¶, the Labour Government of 1997-2010 
advocated the provision of universal services for children whilst focusing both universal and 
targeted services on the most vulnerable WR µSUHYHQW SUREOHPV HVFDODWLQJ¶ (HM Treasury / 
DCSF 2007: 15). The Labour Government also overhauled the youth justice system, central to 
which was the introduction of local multi-agency youth offending teams to work with young 
offenders. During this period, then, practitioners delivering ASB sanctions formed one element 
or µQRGH¶ LQ WKH multi-nodal governance of behaviour (Burris et al. 2005). In this study, 
additional work was undertaken to explore the multi-layered nature of regulation as 
experienced by young people. Individuals with ABCs from Site C (n=171) and Site D (n=268) 
were tracked through local authority prevention and youth justice databases and details 
gathered of all interventions going back to the earliest recorded (in Site C) or to the start of the 
study period (in Site D) and forward to the end of the study period.15 Workload pressures on 
staff in the London Boroughs precluded these additional data being extracted in Sites A and B. 
Restricting the analysis to individuals with ABCs minimised the burden on practitioners in 
Sites C and D charged with mining their prevention and youth justice databases. The findings 
have continued relevance because the ABC, unlike the ASBO, remains a firm fixture on the 
regulatory landscape.      
Many of the young people with ABCs were subject to multiple sanctions and strategies 
of behaviour regulation. Turning first to prevention work with the 171 young signatories to 
                                            
15
 In Site C, the tracking was of 171 people who had signed an ABC at any point up to 31st March 2010. The 
details of six signatories to ABCs organised by the police acting alone emerged after the youth justice and 
prevention data were gathered: these caVHVZHUHH[FOXGHG7KHVLWHVXSSOLHGGHWDLOVRIGDWDVXEMHFWV¶SUHYHQWLRQ
and youth justice interventions up to 31st March 2010. In Site D, the analysis was limited to 268 individuals 
who had signed an ABC between 1st April 2008 and 31st March 2010 and the prevention and youth justice data 
cover this period. It excluded 33 individuals whose only ABC occurred before this period, two people who were 
over 18 when they signed their ABC and one person whose date of birth was ambiguous. Thus the parameters of 
the analysis in Sites C and D are not identical and any comparisons are made with this caveat in mind.    
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ABCs in Site C, 69 (40.4%) appeared in the local auWKRULW\¶VSUHYHQWLRQGDWDEDVHE\WKHHQG
of the study period. Most (61.6%) of the 1,467 prevention activities undertaken by the end of 
the study period were recorded as Positive Activities for Young People (PAYP).16 PAYP 
activities by young people included horse riding, martial arts, canoeing and school holiday 
activities, whilst PAYP work related to young people included professional meetings and 
telephone calls between practitioners. However, case records by council workers who 
monitored compliance with ABCs documented other social welfare focused prevention work 
with young people on ABCs, the details (and sometimes the recipients) of which were absent 
from the central prevention database. Thus the proportion of ABC recipients who received such 
services, and the total amount of agency contact across the group, are higher than these data 
suggest.  
Of the 268 signatories to ABCs in Site D, 70 (26.1%) incurred 2,249 prevention 
interventions between 1st April 2008 and 31st March 2010. Others may have incurred 
prevention measures prior to this period, thus the number engaged in prevention activities by 
31st March 2010 may be higher. Practitioners recorded most of these interventions as having 
RFFXUUHGµLQSHUVRQ¶Q ,WLVDSSDUHQWIURPWKHTXDOLWDWLve descriptions of these 
µLQSHUVRQ¶HYHQWVKRZHYHUWKDWRQO\VRPHLQYROYHGIDFH-to-face contact with young people 
HJ GXULQJ µJURXS ZRUN¶ RU µKRPH YLVLWV¶ ZKLOVW RWKHUV GLG QRW HJ µGLVFXVVLRQ ZLWK
FROOHDJXH¶RULWZDVXQFOHDUHJµHGXFDWLRQPHHWLQJFRQWDFW¶µPDQDJHPHQWVXSHUYLVLRQRI
FDVH¶µDVVHVVPHQWPHHWLQJ¶:KDWLVDSSDUHQWKRZHYHULVWKDWPXFKSUDFWLWLRQHUWLPHDQG
effort was spent on these young people in the name of prevention.    
Turning now to $%&UHFLSLHQWV¶Sathways into and through the youth justice system, 
over three quarters of those from Site C (77.8%, n=133) had been charged with a criminal 
offence and incurred a total of 1,461 charges by the end of the study period. The mean number 
of charges was significantly greater for those whose first ABC came before or in year one rather 
than in year two.17 This suggests that ABCs did not stem the flow of charges, which continued 
to accumulate over time. In Site D, over half of the ABC recipients (57.1%, n=153) incurred a 
total of 736 charges during the study period. As in Site C, the mean number of charges was 
greater for those whose first ABC came before or in year one than in year two, although the 
difference was not statistically significant.  
There were notable differences between the sites in the most prevalent charges. In Site C 
the most prevalent charge was breach of a statutory order, which was incurred by 48 individuals 
and accounted for over one fifth of all charges (22.0%, n=321). )URPWKH$6%2¶VLQFHSWLRQ
critics have argued that this statutory order, breach of which was a criminal offence, might 
actually propel individuals into the criminal justice system (Ashworth et al. 1998). However, 
less than half (n=23) of those charged with breach of a statutory order had breached an ASBO 
and this was rarely their first or only charge. In Site D, in contrast, breach of a statutory order 
was the fifth most common charge: it was incurred by 27 individuals and accounted for just 
one tenth of all charges (10.7%, n=79). Although the data do not specify the nature of the 
                                            
16
 In 2003 the Labour Government announced plans to fund local PAYP schemes to support young people at 
risk of social exclusion (CRG 2006).  
17
 Where the first ABC was on or before 31st March 2009 the mean number of charges was 11.7. Where the first 
ABC occurred between 1st April 2009 and 31st March 2010 this figure was 5.5. An independent samples T-test 
showed the difference in means to be statistically significant (p < 0.001).   
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breach only three of these individuals had an ASBO, and incurred 12 unspecified charges of 
breach between them, suggesting that breach of an ASBO was uncommon.  
In Site C the next three most prevalent charges were theft and handling stolen goods, 
violence against the person, and criminal damage, which together accounted for over one third 
of charges (36.8%). These charges were also prevalent in Site D, where violence against the 
person, theft and handling and criminal damage were the first, second and fourth most prevalent 
charges respectively and together accounted for over two fifths of all charges (42.8%). Public 
order offences were the third most prevalent charge in Site D and the fifth most common in 
Site C (accounting for 13.3% and 9.0% of charges respectively).  
The YJB¶VJUDYLW\VFRUHVLQGLFDWHWKHVHULRXVQHVVRIGLIIHUHQW offences and range from 
one (least serious) to eight (YJB 2014). The data were examined to determine the highest 
gravity score for charges attached to ABC recipients. In Site C the most frequent (modal) 
highest gravity score was six, attained by 41.4% of those known to youth offending services 
(n=55), typically for domestic burglary, drugs offences or robbery. In Site D the most frequent 
(modal) highest gravity score was three, attained by 27.5% of those known to youth offending 
services (n=42), typically for theft, common assault or assault by beating. In both sites the mean 
gravity score was greater for those whose first ABC came before or in year one rather than in 
year two. Although the differences were not statistically significant they suggest that the 
charges incurred became more severe over time.  
Site C also provided details of youth justice outcomes. Almost all of the ABC recipients 
known to youth offending services were recorded as having one or more substantive outcomes 
(n=131, 98.5%), defined by the YJB as pre-court decisions, first-tier penalties, community 
penalties and custodial sentences (YJB 2014: 45). Just 17 of these young people incurred a 
custodial penalty. As might be expected, they tended to have lengthy criminal histories and to 
have progressed through pre-court, first-tier and community penalties. Most (n=12) had been 
charged with breach of an ASBO at some point with the majority (n=10) having been charged 
multiple times: the number of such charges varied between one and 39. The consideration of 
these charges alongside others may have increased overall sentence severity in line with the 
totality principle, according to which sentences should reflect all of the behaviour under 
consideration whilst remaining just and proportionate (Sentencing Council 2012: 5). It may 
also have DFFHOHUDWHG\RXQJSHRSOH¶VMRXUQH\VWKrough lower level interventions and towards 
custody.            
Taken together, this evidence suggests that some recipients of ASB interventions endure 
the haphazard and concurrent use of multiple sanctions and strategies of behaviour regulation. 
That regulation often involves multiple regulators has been well-documented within the 
corporate sphere (Braithwaite 2011: 507-510; Heimer 2011) but not in relation to young 
people. If behavioural change is a staged process and efforts to alter behaviour work best when 
aligned with DSHUVRQ¶Vreadiness and capacity to change (Prochaska and DiClemente 1982), it 
seems unlikely that prevention, ASB and youth justice strategies, which typically employ 
different levers of compliance, would simultaneously be effective in promoting behavioural 
change. Evidence that increased levels of system contact may inhibit desistance also poses a 
challenge to the current approach (McAra and McVie 2007).   
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The timing of interventions in any developmental trajectory 
As already noted, dominant narratives suggest a hierarchical sequencing of interventions, 
whereby informal measures to address incivility are tried first, with recourse to more formal 
and eventually criminal sanctions if this strategy fails. The swift use of informal sanctions is 
GHVLJQHGWRµQLSFULPHLQWKHEXG¶ZLWKWKRVHat the start of a deviant trajectory who may still 
be open to strategies of persuasion and collaboration. The timing of ASB interventions in the 
developmental trajectories of ABC recipients from Sites C and D was examined to see whether 
such conceptions are reflected in practice.  
In Site C, the date of first ABC and first charge were known for most (n=122) of the 133 
ABC recipients with criminal charges. In most cases charges preceded the ABC (n=104, 
85.2%), often by over a year (n=68). It is clear, from both the youth justice data and the case 
records kept by those monitoring compliance with ABCs, that some ABC recipients were 
already entrenched in criminal behaviour. For example, the case notes made before an ABC 
was signed with one young person (ID15) stated that his parents had µlost control over him for 
the past few years¶DQG he ZDVµnot engaging ZLWKVHUYLFHV¶. There were concerns that he was 
µWDNLQJ GUXJV DQG GUXJ UXQQLQJ¶ DQG RWKHU offences were GRFXPHQWHG µKH VWHDOV IURP KLV
SDUHQWVDQGJUDQGSDUHQWV¶µDERXWD\HDUDJRKHUREEHGDQROGODG\¶µKHDVVDXOWHGKLs father 
ZKR KDG KLP DUUHVWHG¶ The use of ABCs with people with established criminal careers 
contradicts the developmental logic of ASB strategies as tools to nip nascent criminality in the 
bud. Also, evidence suggests that the targeted use of ABCs with people who are at least 
considering changing their behaviour may have more chance of success (Prochaska and 
DiClemente 1982).  
In Site D, the date of first ABC (at any time up to 31st March 2010) and the date of first 
charge (between 1st April 2008 and 31st March 2010) were known for all of the 153 ABC 
recipients with criminal charges. In over half of these cases (n=86, 56.2%) the first ABC 
preceded the first known charge: in the remaining cases (n=67, 43.8%) the first known charge 
came first. However, some of these young people may have incurred charges before 1st April 
2008, so the number of individuals who incurred a criminal charge before signing an ABC may 
have been higher. Further investigation found evidence of ABCs being used with young people 
with multiple criminal charges. One individual, for example, had incurred 11 charges of theft 
and handling stolen goods, breach of a statutory order, breach of bail, violence, and criminal 
damage before signing an ABC aged 13 years (ID303) whilst another had incurred five charges 
of criminal damage, public order offences, breach of bail, and breach of a statutory order before 
signing an ABC aged 16 years (ID377). $JDLQWKHXVHRI$%&VµWRQLSFULPHLQWKHEXG¶ZKHQ
crime is already in bloom contradicts the dominant rationale for such measures and may be 
ineffective.  
Taken together, the findings show that 104 of the 171 individuals with ABCs from Site 
C (60.8%) and at least 67 of the 268 ABC recipients from Site D (25.0%) incurred one or more 
criminal charges before their ABC. This confirms the multi-layered nature of regulation and 
the parallel (rather than consecutive) use of ASB measures and youth justice sanctions in some 
areas. Whilst this confounds dominant narratives about the timing of interventions in a 
developmental trajectory, the bi-directional flow of young people between these systems of 
social control is unsurprising given the police role as a principal gatekeeper to both systems. 
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The Edinburgh Study found that whilst persistent serious offending, low socio-economic status 
DQG HQJDJHPHQW LQ µULVN\¶ EHKDYLRXUV HJ GUXJ DQG DOFRKRO FRQVXPSWLRQ WUXDQF\ DQG
µKDQJLQJDURXQG¶LQFUHDVHG\RXQJSHRSOH¶VULVNRI having adversarial contact with the police, 
KDYLQJµSUHYLRXVIRUP¶ ZDVµE\IDUWKHPRVWSRZHUIXO¶SUHGLFWRURIIXWXUHDQGPRUHVHULRXV
contact with the police (McAra and McVie 2005: 21). As the police gaze falls on µWKHXVXDO
VXVSHFWV¶so the incivilities of some individuals in particular may be targeted through cyclical 
processes that foster more and more serious police contact (McAra and McVie 2005, 2007).      
 
Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated how ASB interventions may be triggered by a wide range of 
attributes and behaviours LQFOXGLQJEHLQJµDWULVN¶RIharm or becoming delinquent, engaging 
in everyday childhood misdemeanours, and diverse actions spanning low-level incivilities 
through to serious criminal infractions. Practice is frequently VKDSHG E\ SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ 
organisational priorities. Correspondingly, opinions vary between different professionals, and 
within and between areas, as to what constitutes ASB. Abundant variation persists between 
sites in the operation of an enforcement pyramid of key sanctions to address ASB. The 
existence in some localities RIDGGLWLRQDOµWLHUV¶, and the multiple use of informal and voluntary 
sanctions, might be rationalised as a means of diverting young people away from more formal 
VDQFWLRQVDQGDOORZLQJ WKHPWR µJURZRXWRIFULPH¶EHIRUH LQFXUULQJDFULPLQDOFRQYLFWLRn. 
&RQYHUVHO\ KRZHYHU LI µGLVFLSOLQH « EHJHWV IXUWKHU DQG JUHDWHU GLVFLSOLQH¶ 0F$UD DQG
McVie 2012: 368) then these practices might have the very opposite effect, serving to ossify 
problematic behaviour through processes of heightened surveillance and labelling.  
Many of the signatories to ABCs in this study were subject to multiple (and sometimes 
contradictory) strategies of behaviour regulation, appearing simultaneously in prevention, ASB 
and youth justice caseloads. The research found evidence of ABCs being signed after criminal 
charges had been incurred, and by young people with long offending histories, apparently 
contradicting the dominant rationale for their use as a means of forestalling a deviant trajectory. 
Despite widespread belief that ABCs are effective in this regard, the cohorts studied here 
incurred more, and more serious, criminal charges in the period after the first ABC than in the 
same period before. This is not to suggest that the ABC caused an overall deterioration in 
behaviour across these groups. In the absence of self-report data it is not possible to say whether 
the increased number and severity of charges reflected a deterioration in behaviour, or 
increased monitoring, or a combination of both. What is clear, however, is that the findings do 
not support the notion that ABCs, as used in the study sites, actually µQLSFULPHLQWKHEXG¶ 
Nonetheless, England and Wales has seen a sustained decline in victim-reported crime 
since the mid-1990s (ONS 2016). Paradoxically, reductions in the number of first time entrants 
to the youth justice system and the number of juveniles sentenced only date from the years 
ending March 2007 and March 2008 respectively (Ministry of Justice / YJB 2016). One 
compelling explanation, given the timing of the statistical shifts, may be the impact of two 
contradictory trends in the response to juvenile incivility. The first, as exemplified by the 
/DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶V ASB agenda and the use of ASBOs and ABCs in the decade leading up 
to 2007/8, involved processes RIµGHILQLQJGHYLDQF\XS¶ through early intervention such that 
µRQFHLQQRFHQWEHKDYLRXUQRZVWDQGVFRQGHPQHGDVGHYLDQW¶(Krauthammer 1993: 20). More 
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recently, we may have been witnessing a counter-current to earlier trends, resulting in re-
GHILQLQJµGHYLDQF\GRZQ¶0R\QLKDQ through greater recourse to diversion. Our research 
adds weight to the view that thresholds for early intervention are not only highly variable across 
localities, social groups and tenure type but also across time.       
When senior practitioners from one of the research sites were asked in 2016 about 
shifting youth justice trends and developments,18 they confirmed the impact of such µthreshold 
dynamics¶. The abolition of targets to increase offences brought to justice was described as 
having had µWKHELJJHVWVLQJOHLPSDFW¶RQORFDOWUHnds. These targets, introduced in 2001 and 
subsequently criticised for encouraging the police to pursue minor offences (Morgan 2007), 
were amended in 2008 to focus on violent crimes before being abolished in 2010 (Ministry of 
Justice 2014: 5). Additionally, local SDIHU 6FKRRO¶V 3DUWQHUVKLSV '&6) HW DO  have 
enabled police to work alongside local schools to address problems at the outset, prompting 
VFKRROV WR µFRQVXPHWKHLURZQVPRNH¶ - i.e. manage problems internally and less formally. 
More generally, the senior practitioners maintained that minor cases which appeared in the 
youth court a decade ago were no longer doing soGULYHQE\DUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWµ\RXQJSHRSOH
QHHGWREHGHDOWZLWKDVORZGRZQDVSRVVLEOH¶LQWKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHSURFHVV   
To date, there are no official data on, or empirical studies of, the use of the orders that 
have replaced the ASBO. As noted above, however, the ASBO was the least used of the key 
sanctions. This paper has focused on other, more widely used, informal and voluntary measures 
that remain central to ongoing strategies of behaviour regulation. It could be argued that ASB 
warning letters, ABCs and ASBOs also contributed (intentionally or otherwise) to recent youth 
justice trends. The findings discussed here, however, preclude such a simplistic conclusion. 
Rather than operating in isolation, such tools form interconnected parts of a bigger whole, a 
µregulatory ecosystem¶, which interacts with the wider socio-economic and political landscape. 
This paper has examined the complex and contradictory norms that inform, and the interactions 
between, prevention, ASB and youth justice interventions. However, as Black (2001: 208) 
notes, µUHJXODWLRQRFFXUVLQPDQ\ORFDWLRQVLQPDQ\IRUD¶DQGµLQPDQ\URRPV¶ and interaction 
effects between these and other individual and family-focused strategies of behaviour 
regulation are also likely. Moreover, the overall effect of any regulatory regime may be shaped 
by external forces, as the history of defining deviancy up and down illustrates.    
These arguments have implications for theoretical perspectives on the regulation of 
problem youth. Traditional debates about the effectiveness of individual tools and strategies 
DUHLQVXIILFLHQWZKHQUHJXODWLRQWDNHVSODFHµLQPDQ\URRPV¶They should also serve to remind 
criminologists that efforts to induce behavioural change outside of the criminal justice system 
can constitute potent, punitive and disciplinary sanctions. Hence, new conceptual tools are 
needed that are attuned to the complex interaction effects between different sanctions and 
strategies, their intended and unintended effects, and their existence within a wider regulatory 
landscape. The evidence presented here and elsewhere (Crawford et al. 2016) should provide 
a stimulus to ongoing debates about the operation and efficacy of contemporary mechanisms 
to regulate juvenile behaviour and a platform for future theoretical development.  
                                            
18
 In March 2016 members of the research team discussed recent trends with the Directors RI&KLOGUHQ¶V
Services and the Youth Offending Service in Site C.    
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Whilst the panoply of ASB interventions, when first introduced, formed part of a wider 
governmental agenda that µGHILQHG GHYLDQF\ XS¶ WKH FXUUHQW landscape may afford new 
opportunities to revisit their role, rationale and (crucially) their conformity with principles of 
responsive regulation and procedural fairness. Thus re-envisaged, ABCs and early warnings 
might afford more appropriate levels of challenge and support to address youthful misconduct, 
in ways that avoid unnecessary stigmatisation, coercion and criminalisation. This will 
necessitate a coordinated and coherent approach that is attentive to interaction effects between 
the many PHFKDQLVPVRIUHJXODWLRQWKDWLPSLQJHXSRQ\RXQJSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXU.  
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